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The Pursuit of "Voluntary" Tax Compliance
in a Globalized World
JENNIFER HEPP*
ABSTRACT
Globalization diminishes the U.S. government's ability to enforce the
income tax by undermining the Internal Revenue Service's information
advantage. U.S. taxpayers are able to hold their money overseas, where
the IRS's information-gathering abilities are at their lowest ebb, with
increasing ease. Tax treaties aim to rectify the IRS's information
disadvantage abroad by encouraging foreign countries, particularly tax
havens, to share information with the IRS. However, these treaties have
been largely ineffective. Instead, it may be time for the United States to
go the way of other developed countries and reform its tax structure to
reduce reliance on the income tax and adopt, instead, a value-added tax.
INTRODUCTION
Globalization threatens the ability of the United States Internal
Revenue Service (IRS or the tax bureau) to enforce the income tax by
undermining the tax bureau's ability to gather information about
taxpayers. The IRS relies on information reporting to elicit "voluntary"
(rather than compelled) payment of income taxes.1
One major way that globalization undermines the IRS's
information-gathering abilities is by providing more opportunities for
U.S. residents to hold funds in foreign financial institutions. 2 By taking
their money overseas-"tax flight"-U.S. residents are able to avoid the
* Executive Submissions Editor, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, J.D.
Candidate, 2013, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Ajay Mehrotra for his invaluable guidance and my parents, Denny Hepp and
Kathy Gordon, for their loving support.
1. See Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance and the Reformed IRS, 51 U. KAN. L. REV.
971, 972-76 (2003).
2. See Steven A. Dean, The Incomplete Global Market for Tax Information, 49 B.C. L.
REv. 605, 626 (2008). Another method for avoiding U.S. taxation is through expatriation.
See id. at 627.
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reach of the IRS's information-gathering capacity. 3 As money drifts
away from the United States and flows into tax havens, the IRS's
information-gathering abilities quickly fade-virtually eliminating the
tax bureau's most important enforcement tool.4
Due to tax flight, the IRS is often unable to rely on its traditional,
cost-effective enforcement mechanism of third-party reporting by
domestic financial institutions. Alternative enforcement mechanisms
like the following are more costly and less effective than third-party
reporting: relying on international information-exchange agreements;
paying the tax havens for information; 5 or switching from the income
tax to a consumption tax, such as a sales tax or value-added tax (VAT).
Switching to a consumption tax, which is generally characterized as
"regressive"-that is, low- and middle-income individuals pay more
taxes in proportion to their income than high-income individuals-could
have the unintended effect of widening the already expansive U.S.
wealth gap. 6 The historical development of the income tax demonstrates
that third-party reporting and withholding are vital to the tax's
success;7 without structural enforcement, switching to an entirely
different tax, most likely the VAT, may be the United States' only viable
option.
This note argues that globalization has and will continue to
undermine enforcement of the income tax-which relies on third-party
information reporting-and that the best alternative is a progressive
consumption tax. This note examines the history of the income tax and
the effects of globalization, and demonstrates that the structure of
income tax administration-reliance on third-party reporting-makes
3. See id. at 628-30.
4. See id.
5. See Steven A. Dean, Philosopher Kings and International Tax: A New Approach to
Tax Havens, Tax Flight, and International Tax Cooperation, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 911, 913-15
(2007).
6. Income inequality in the United States has been on the rise since the late-1970s.
TAX PROGRESSIVITY AND INCOME INEQUALITY 4 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1996); Ian Ayres &
Aaron S. Edlin, Don't Tax the Rich. Tax Inequality Itself, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2011 ('In
1980, the wealthiest 1 percent of Americans made 9.1 percent of our nation's pre-tax
income; by 2006 the share had risen to 18.8 percent ... in after-tax dollars, our wealthiest.
1 percent over this same period went from receiving 7.7 percent to 16.3 percent of our
nation's income."). Cf. Arthur S. Alderson & Frangois Nielsen, Globalization and the Great
U-Turn: Income Inequality Trends in 16 OECD Countries, 107 AM. J. SOC. 1244, 1246
(2002) (explaining that income inequality in the United States began to rise around 1970
after declining since the 1930s). The widening wealth gap led scholars to argue that "at
some point the concentration of economic power could undermine the democratic requisite
of dispersed political power" because the wealthy are able to use their vast resources to
influence elections. Ayres & Edlin, supra.
7. See, infra, Section I. C-D.
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the income tax particularly susceptible to evasion through tax flight.
Part I traces how third-party reporting became rooted in the income tax
system at four key points in U.S. history: the Civil War, the enactment
of the Sixteenth Amendment, World War I (WWI), and World War II
(WWII). Part II explains how globalization has undermined enforcement
of the income tax, and explores alternative enforcement mechanisms
with particular emphasis on the VAT.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THIRD-PARTY REPORTING
Each year, the IRS audits less than 1 percent of individual
taxpayers and assesses penalties to evaders in amounts that are mere
portions of the actual taxes owed to the IRS.8 The consequences for
evasion are, on average, too low to cause rational individuals to comply,9
and yet most taxpayers comply by accurately reporting and paying their
full tax burdens. 10 This observation has led to the characterization of
the U.S. income tax as "voluntary.""l
Referring to the U.S. income tax as a voluntary tax is not entirely
accurate, however. The overall probability of audit does not accurately
reflect the risk that an individual considers when determining whether
to attempt income tax evasion. For example, if an employer submits its
employees' annual salaries to the IRS and an employee omits the salary
income from her own return, the personal return "will be flagged for
further scrutiny with a probability much closer to 100% than to 2%."12
Thus, the typical income taxpayer whose salary income is subject to
withholding reports her tax liability accurately because of the
expectation (with near 100 percent certainty) of being caught for
evasion.13
U.S. income tax compliance rates are among the highest in the
8. See, e.g., Lederman, supra note 1, at 973.
9. See id.
10. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-391T, TAX COMPLIANCE:
MULTIPLE APPROACHES ARE NEEDED TO REDUCE THE TA GAP 8 (2007) [hereinafter GAO]
(estimating that the 2001 tax gap was 16%, or 84% compliance).
11. "Voluntary compliance" refers to the tax code placing the burden of calculating and
reporting income tax liability on the entity that is responsible for payment. Leandra
Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax Compliance, 60
STAN. L. REV. 695, 711 (2007) [hereinafter Speed Bumps].
12. Joel Slemrod, Trust in Public Finance 9 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 9187, 2002) [hereinafter Trust], available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9187.
The IRS uses a computer matching system to compare returns between entities with
corresponding income and expenses.
13. See id.
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world due to third-party withholding and information reporting. 14
Third-party withholding 15 and information reporting16 contribute to a
taxpayer's "visibility."'17 The more visible a taxpayer is-that is, the
more available her tax-sensitive information is to the IRS-the more
likely she is to voluntarily comply with taxation.'8 Assuming that third
parties have incentives to accurately report or withhold and remit,
rather than collude with taxpayers, 19 or not report at all, taxpayers
under the third-party umbrella have minimal opportunity to avoid
taxation.20
Compliance rates tend to be highest where a domestic corporation is
responsible for reporting or withholding income. 21 Third-party reporting
requirements essentially regulate the behavior of institutions, usually
corporations, rather than individuals. 22 The size and visibility of
corporations eases the IRS's administrative task.23 Additionally,
corporations are more likely to voluntarily comply with tax laws than
individual taxpayers because they "have significant economic incentives
to do so."24
The sections that follow address how third-party withholding and
reporting became firmly rooted in the U.S. income tax structure,
arguing that history demonstrates that the IRS's ability to administer
14. See Lederman, supra note 1, at 973-76.
15. For example, an employer withholding a portion of an employee's wages and
forwarding tax payments to the IRS.
16. For example, a financial institution recording interest earned and providing the
IRS with the information.
17. See GAO, supra note 10, at 12 (demonstrating that compliance rates increase as
taxpayers are subject to greater "visibility").
18. Id.
19. See Speed Bumps, supra note 11, at 724-28. The Internal Revenue Code
distinguishes between persons that have incentives that align with the IRS's enforcement
goals and those who have incentives to evade. See id. For example, tortfeasors generally
have an incentive to minimize the settlement while tort victims have an incentive to
maximize the settlement, so the IRS can rely on the settlement as an accurate reflection of
medical costs. See id. However, if the third-party has an incentive to collude with the
taxpayer, such as if the tortfeasor and the taxpayer were related parties, the IRS may not
be able to rely on the settlement as an accurate reflection of costs. See id.
20. A taxpayer whose income tax is withheld has virtually no opportunity to avoid the
income tax and a taxpayer whose tax liability is reported to the tax bureau is able to avoid
the tax as an initial matter but faces a high risk of audit. See Trust, supra note 12, at 9.
21. See GAO, supra note 10, at 12.
22. Joel Slemrod, The Economics of Corporate Tax Selfishness, 57 NATL TAX J. 877,
891 (2004) ('The IRS correctly believes that it is much more efficient to collect and monitor
taxes remitted by a smaller group of employers compared to taxes remitted by a hundred
million or so employees."); Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of
Regulating Behavior, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 655, 666 (2006).
23. See Cheng, supra note 22.
24. Id.
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the income tax to a wide tax base hinges on its ability to gather
information from third parties.
A. Civil War: The First Income Tax
The first income tax was implemented in 1861 as a temporary,
emergency measure to provide desperately needed revenue for the Civil
War.25 The Civil War income tax was unique in that it fell on only the
highest-earning residents, 26 which led to .its characterization as a "class
tax."
27
At the time, the government relied on consumption taxes, 28 and did
not have the necessary infrastructure to enforce the income tax.29
Implementation of the income tax required "a new and robust
administrative agency, one capable of mounting a nationwide collection
effort."30 Whereas consumption taxes were paid by businesses that
already had the infrastructure in place to keep records as well as an
existing relationship with the government, income taxes had to be
collected from a new set of people-the individual taxpayers themselves.
Due to administrative difficulties, Congress's first attempt to enact the
income tax had no practical effect. 31
The Revenue Act of 1861 enacted the first national income tax,32 but
25. The ability to quickly raise revenue was a matter of national security because the
revenue directly funded the war efforts as well as maintained the country's
creditworthiness so that the United States could borrow funds to make up for revenue
shortfalls. See N. P. Hill, Payment of the National Debt, 143 N. AM. REV. 209, 213 (1886)
("Clearly, this country has no army or navy in existence of which foreign nations need be
very much afraid. What they respect is our power to raise, equip, and maintain armies
and navies, and they know that this power becomes greater in proportion to our progress
in freeing ourselves from financial clogs and encumbrances.").
26. See generally Joseph J. Thorndike, Reforming the Internal Revenue Service: A
Comparative History, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 717 (2001). Some proponents of the income tax
framed the tax as fair because it taxed those most able to pay and those who enjoyed the
greatest benefits from America's stability. Id. at 720. An article from the New York Times
argued that the income tax was designed "to place the heaviest burden upon that portion
of the people who have the largest material stake in the country and the nearest interest
in the integrity, public faith and lasting stability of the Government; the men of money
and of productive stocks and other income paying securities." Id. (quoting The Internal
Tax Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1862, at 4) (internal quotation marks omitted).
27. See Charlotte Twight, Evolution of Federal Income Tax Withholding: The Machinery of
Institutional Change, 14 CATO J. 359, 364 (1995).
28. A consumption tax is a tax on spending, whereas an income tax is a tax on
earnings.
29. See Thorndike, supra note 26, at 719.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 721.
32. Revenue Act of 1861, ch. 45, 49 Stat. 309.
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left the details of enforcement up to the U.S. Treasury. 33 The failure to
provide an enforcement mechanism proved damning; Secretary of the
Treasury Salmon P. Chase recognized that the nation was desperate for
war funding,34 but was not willing to take a risk on wasting the Bureau
of Internal Revenue's (BIR's) 35 resources on implementing the income
tax because he believed that enforcement would be too expensive. 36
Dissatisfied, Congress enacted the Revenue Act of 1862, which dealt
with the enforcement and administration problems by shifting the
enforcement burden to third parties through a prescribed withholding
mechanism. The Revenue Act required withholding at the source of the
income for certain taxpayers.37 Corporations were required to withhold
taxes on dividends and interest, and the federal government was
required to withhold taxes from government employees' salaries. 38 For
taxpayers not falling into these categories, the BIR relied on voluntary
compliance and grappled with ways to encourage taxpayers to
self-report their own incomes accurately and make timely payments. 39
33.
[I]t shall be the duty of the President . . . to appoint one principal assessor and
one principal collector in each of the States and Territories of the United States,
and in the District of Columbia, to assess and collect the internal duties or
income tax imposed by this act, with authority in each of said officers to appoint
so many assistants as the public service may require, to be approved by the
Secretary of the Treasury. The said taxes to be assessed and collected under
such regulations as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe.
Id. § 50 (emphasis added).
34. See S. P. CHASE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON THE STATE OF
THE FINANCES, S. Doc. No. 37-2, at 12 (2d Sess. 1861) ('CTo meet these increased [military]
demands, arising almost wholly from the increase of the army and navy and the increase
of pay and rations beyond the original estimates, large additional appropriations have
been and will be necessary.").
35. The Bureau of Internal Revenue, or BIR, is the forerunner to the present-day IRS.
36.
Considering... how large a proportion of incomes, after the deductions sanctioned by
law, will fall within the exemption limit of $800 a year; and considering also what
numerous questions will certainly perplex its assessment and collection, [the
Secretary of the Treasury] respectfully submits to the consideration of Congress
whether the probable revenue affords a sufficient reason for putting in operation, at
great cost, the machinery of the act.
CHASE, supra note 34, at 15. See also Thorndike, supra note 26, at 721.
37. Revenue Act of 1862, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 432 (1862). Another significant difference
between the two acts is that the Revenue Act of 1862 implemented the first progressive
rate income tax. See id. at 473. Taxpayers with incomes greater than $600 faced a tax rate
of 3% and those with incomes over $10,000 were taxed at a rate of 5%. Id.
38. Id. at 472.
39. One attempted method was publicizing tax assessments to create social pressure to
file accurate tax returns: publication "afford[s] every tax-payer an opportunity of
ascertaining what returns his neighbors have made. He is interested in these returns,
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Due in part to public dissatisfaction with the inconsistent
enforcement of the income tax (some taxpayers self-reported very low
incomes) and general enforcement difficulties, Congress let the income
tax lapse after 1871.40 Excise taxes and tariffs still formed the core of
the government's tax policy. 41
B. The Sixteenth Amendment
Two decades after the close of the Civil War, Congress responded to
calls for more progressive taxation by enacting the first peacetime
income tax in 1894.42 However, just one year later, the Supreme Court
declared the tax unconstitutional in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust
Company.43 In Pollock, the Court held that certain provisions of the Tax
Act of 1894 were unconstitutional because they established a "direct"
because the burden of the national duties is a common one, and every person should be
required to pay his due proportion of it." Thorndike, supra note 26, at 727-28 (quoting
Publication of the List of Incomes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1865, at 4) (internal quotation
marks omitted). An editorial published in the New York Times argued that publication
was necessary to address the problem of tax evasion because auditing was ineffective as
the BIR was either unable or, due to corruption, unwilling to ferret out and punish
evaders. See Letter to the Editor, Publication of the Income Tax Lists, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20,
1865. The author believed that noncompliance was a rampant problem, stating that
"[hiundreds of instances can be pointed out in that single list where men report their
incomes very far below what every man of common sence [sic] knows them to be." Id. The
author also believed that publication could alert the community to noncompliance because
one could ascertain "that the returns in an immense number of cases are utterly
unreliable and flagrantly false" with just "a glance at the list." Id. Evasion would violate
the community's sense of fairness and evoke social repercussions to the evader. See
Thorndike, supra note 26, at 727. Public support for the income tax waned with the end of
the Civil War, Twight, supra note 27, at 367, and Congress prohibited publication in 1870
in an attempt to avoid losing further support, notwithstanding concerns about
noncompliance, Thorndike, supra note 26, at 728.
40. See supra text accompanying note 39 (publication revealed evasion through
falsified self-reports). Allegations of corruption within the BIR were another source of
public dissatisfaction with the income tax. See Thorndike, supra note 26, at 729. The BIR's
decentralized structure eventually brought administrative problems, including allegations
of corruption and mismanagement, and these administrative problems combined with
"waning support for steep wartime taxation" led to a push for reform of the BIR during the
mid-1860s. Id. at 719. The BIR survived the reform movement, but the income tax did not.
See id.
41. See Thorndike, supra note 26, at 722.
42. See id. at 737-38 (noting that "Congress resisted such [tax reform] efforts until the
1890s, when a steep economic downturn helped galvanize support for tariff and tax
reform, especially among southern and western Populists."). Congress authorized a 2% tax
on incomes over $4,000, which only reached the richest 10% of U.S. residents and citizens.
Id.
43. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), aff'd on reh'g, 158 U.S.
601 (1895).
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tax without allocating the revenue from the tax to the states according
to population. 44 Specifically, the Court interpreted the provisions
establishing a tax on dividends, interest, and rent as direct taxes on
property. 45
Undaunted, income tax supporters continued lobbying for another
income tax with the hope of challenging the Supreme Court.46 Instead,
progressives struck a political compromise, substituting passage of the
1909 corporate income tax47 and the Sixteenth Amendment for another
income tax bill.48 The Sixteenth Amendment, which became effective in
1913, eliminated the requirement that Congress apportion direct taxes
among the states by population, authorizing Congress to levy taxes on
income from property, like interest, dividends, and rent, without
apportionment. 49
The 1913 Act, a tax bill passed in response to the Sixteenth
Amendment, authorized more expansive withholding than the Revenue
Act of 1862.50 Whereas the Civil War tax bill required only federal
government employers to withhold taxes, the 1913 Act required all
employers, financial institutions, and other organizations "making
payments of more than $3,000 in interest, salary, or other fixed income
to an individual . . . to withhold tax; in some cases, even smaller
amounts triggered withholding."5 1
C. WWI: Tax Base Expansion and Adoption of Third-Party Reporting
The 1913 Act laid the groundwork for the United States' modern
44. Id. at 607-08.
45. Id.
46. There was a strong populist push within the Senate to pass legislation similar to
that invalidated in Pollock in order to confront the Supreme Court, but President Taft
sought to avoid a challenge that might undermine the Supreme Court's authority.
Thorndike, supra note 26, at 738-39. See also Twight, supra note 27, at 367-68.
47. The corporate income tax did not face the same constitutional challenge as the
individual income tax because it was billed as an excise tax on the privilege of doing
business. Twight, supra note 27, at 368 n.8.
48. See Thorndike, supra note 26, at 739. The corporate income tax was formulated by
GOP leaders, including President Taft, to "siphon off support for general income taxation"
and preserve GOP unity by fracturing the coalition of Democrats and western Republicans
formed with the agenda of passing a general individual income tax again. Id. at 738. The
Sixteenth Amendment was also part of the GOP's compromise, but the GOP leaders
thought that the constitutional amendment would be a minor concession and did not even
expect ratification by the states. Id. at 739.
49. U.S. Const. amend. XVI.
50. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(D), 38 Stat. 114, 168-69 (1913). See also
Thorndike, supra note 26, at 740-41.
51. Thorndike, supra note 26, at 740-41.
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income tax policy by instituting a broad withholding requirement; and
the WWI tax acts brought the country a step closer to its modern tax
policy by expanding the taxable base52 and enforcing the tax through
third-party information reporting. Income tax developments from the
WWI era would be solidified during WWII when the tax base was
expanded even further and information reporting by employers was
replaced with withholding.
Revenues from the 1913 tax began to drop as early as 1914, so in
1916, a year before the United States entered World War I, Congress
turned to the income tax to make up for the revenue shortfall by raising
the rates on the existing tax base.5 3 Later, Congress raised revenue by
lowering exemption levels to expand the tax base to reach 20 percent of
households-a much broader tax base than ever before. 54
The rapid rise in the tax base and revenue collections stretched the
BIR's administrative capacity. 55 The BIR responded by tripling the size
of its individual income tax unit in 1918 and then doubling the unit's
employees again in 1919.56 Despite the staff increases, the agency was
still falling behind in enforcement: "In 1918, the commissioner [of the
BIR] told a congressional committee that 4 million individual returns
for 1916 and 1917 were still unaudited. ' 57 With most of its growth in
staff and the majority of audits taking place at its headquarters, the
BIR became increasingly centralized. 58
52. That is, by lowering exemption levels and making more individuals subject to the
income tax, or at least filing requirements.
53. Thorndike, supra note 26, at 741-42.
54. See Ajay K Mehrotra, American Economic Development, Managerial Corporate
Capitalism, and the Institutional Foundations of the Modern Income Tax, 73 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 25, 51-52 (2010) ("At the height of the World War I tax regime, the
exemption level dropped to $1000 ($2000 for married couples), normal rates soared to 6%
for the first $4,000 of income above exemption levels and 12% for all income beyond
$4,000, and surtax rates skyrocketed to a top rate of 65%.").
55. See Thorndike, supra note 26, at 743-47.
56. Id. at 745.
57. Id.
58. See id. at 744. 'The growth in headquarters staff reflected the centralized process
for dealing with income tax returns, all of which were sent to Washington for
mathematical checking and many of which were audited." Id. 'The relatively small
number of field agents, moreover, made it impossible to audit an adequate number of
returns . . . 5% of individual returns and 15% of corporate returns required further
examination, but the agency's field staff was too small to undertake the task." Id.
In 1917, as the agency began to gear up for war taxation, it employed 524
headquarters staff and 4,529 field staff. By 1918, total staff had grown to 9,600,
and it rose further to roughly 14,000, 18,000, 20,000, and 21,000 in each of the
subsequent years. Headquarters staff grew more quickly than field staff,
increasing almost fourteen times during the period, compared to just a three-fold
increase for field staff.
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Withholding was not used as a primary means of enforcement for
long. In 1917, Congress switched from third-party withholding to
third-party information reporting.59 More than one explanation has
been offered for why withholding was replaced with third-party
information reporting. One account argues that withholding was too
burdensome for the BIR,60 while another argues that withholding was
eliminated to reduce popular criticism of the income tax.6 1 Information
reporting shifted the responsibility for actually paying the tax back to
the individual taxpayer while maintaining the BIR's information
advantage. 62 The switch did not solve the administrative burden,
however, because even the inflow of information was difficult for the
BIR to deal with given its limited administrative capacity.63
D. WWII. The Mass Base Tax and Adoption of Withholding
Initially, the income tax was levied only on those with the highest
incomes, but due to the outbreak of WWII, the income tax's reach was
expanded to many more residents and became a "mass tax" rather than
a "class tax."64 The taxable base expanded substantially-increasing
from 3.9 million tax returns filed in 1939 to 42.6 million in 1945-as did
income tax revenue--rising from $2.2 billion in 1939 to $35.1 billion in
1945.65 At the end of the war, 90 percent of American workers filed tax
returns and 60 percent actually paid income tax.66 Prior to 1941, the
Treasury Department had always received fewer than eight million
individual income tax returns each year, but by 1941 the number of
returns received had risen to fifteen million and, in 1943, officials
expected that number to rise to thirty-five million returns. 67
To administer the tax to a hugely expanded base, Congress adopted
Id. at 743-44.
59. Id. at 744.
60. Id. at 744 (Congress switched from third-party withholding to third-party
information reporting in 1917 because "stoppage-at-source techniques for collecting the
income tax ... proved a cumbersome process for the agency.").
61. "Based on public criticism, Treasury Secretary William G. McAdoo reported that 'it
would be very advantageous to . . . do away with the withholding of income tax at the
source' because it would 'eliminate a great deal of criticism which has been directed
against the law."' Twight, supra note 27, at 369 (quoting U.S. Treasury Department 1916:
19).
62. See Thorndike, supra note 26, at 744.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 753.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 754.
67. Twight, supra note 27, at 370.
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withholding once again.68 Congress passed the Current Tax Payment
Act in 1943 and implemented withholding, which has remained in place
ever since. 69 Nonetheless, some "BIR officials were notable skeptics of
the plan, arguing that withholding would require too many additional
personnel and expensive mechanization." 70  This skepticism was
well-founded. Withholding was eliminated during WWI due to its
unpopularity with taxpayers and because the BIR lacked the necessary
administrative capacity.
Withholding did prove to be an effective enforcement mechanism
during WWII, unlike in previous periods. 71  Public opinion,
administrative capacity, and economic structure variables appear to
have converged to make the initial adoption and subsequent
institutionalization of withholding effective.72
The BIR's administrative capacity had expanded by 1943. 73 At that
point, the IRS had greater experience with withholding because it had
used withholding for the Social Security Act since 1935,74 and for the
68. See id. at 369.
69. Id.
70. Thorndike, supra note 26, at 754.
71. See id.
72. The public may have been more receptive to withholding during WWII than during
WWI because, in addition to the patriotism boost that public opinion likely received
during both periods, the WWII period also offered tax cancellation. See Twight, supra note
27, at 375. The Ruml Plan, proposed in 1942 by Beardsley Ruml who was chairman of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York at the time, would cancel most of an individual's tax
liability for the year to avoid a year with double tax liability, which would have occurred
with an immediate switch to withholding's pay-as-you-go structure. See id. Charlotte
Twight argues that Ruml's proposal to forgive one year's income tax was "absolutely
critical to-and perhaps the proximate cause of-public acceptance of income tax
withholding in 1943." Id.
The public may also have been more receptive to the income tax in general.
When asked why withholding from the 1913 Act was abandoned:
Treasury official Paul's response ... captured the resistance-eroding effect of an
institutional foot in the door: "At that time taxes collected under an income tax
system was [sic] something new in this country and I think it is fair to say there
was some resistance to collecting at the source .... We were not used to being
income tax payers, but now we have gone along for a period of about 30 years
under the income tax system and I think the analogy is far from being very
relevant."
Id. at 383 (quoting U.S. House Hearings 1943: 82).
73. See id. at 382-83. An advocate for withholding explained that withholding for the
Social Security Act was already taking place and that the government already had "a
system of reporting at the source by employers, a force of internal revenue field agents,
and so forth. Accordingly, we have the makings of an adequate tax machine. Most of the
parts are there." Id. at 383. (quoting U.S. House Hearings 1941: 345) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
74. Id.
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Victory Tax since 1942. The Social Security Tax provided the BIR and
its employees with the necessary experience collecting a tax at the
source and the Victory Tax established the "essential machinery" for
withholding.75 Additionally, improvements in education levels at the
beginning of the twentieth century resulted in increasingly
well-educated and trained public officials, causing the government's
administrative capacity to expand. 76 Finally, accounting innovations
eased the BIR's administrative burden. 77
Structural changes in the U.S. economy made withholding a more
viable enforcement mechanism by channeling taxpayers into
employment that subjected individuals to reporting and withholding,
thus improving the reporting and withholding capacity of third parties.
Industrialization, "the pronounced shift from agriculture to large-scale
manufacturing," facilitated tax administration "by helping supplant
household production and barter transactions with a more liquid cash
economy."78
During the same period, corporations became increasingly able to
act as third-party enforcers of the income tax, allowing the tax bureau
to shift administrative responsibilities to corporations. 79 The new
corporate management structure-separation of ownership and
control-adopted by corporations made them well-suited to carry out
third-party reporting and withholding. Whereas "traditional, often
family-owned, companies combined the responsibilities of ownership
and control," modern businesses employed "managerial corporate
capitalism," which consisted of separating the tasks of management and
ownership.8 0 Managerial tasks, including monitoring and coordination,
were carried out by "a hierarchy of salaried managers who generally
had little equity stake in the businesses they operated."81 This
separation of interests made modern corporations, which were run by
"business bureaucrats," prime candidates to take on some of the
administrative burden of the income tax.8 2  Furthermore, the
unprecedented size of corporations as organizational units made them
well-poised to conduct withholding and information reporting.83 "The
75. Id. at 383.
76. Mehrotra, supra note 54, at 36-37.
77. See id. at 46.
78. Id. at 37.
79. See id. at 46.
80. Id. at 41.
81. Id.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 41-42. One significant period was the "great merger movement," which
took place from 1895 to 1904, and consisted of consolidation of corporations through
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economies of scale that were driving mass production and distribution
S.. facilitate[d] income-tax collections" by driving corporate growth and
allowing large corporations to spread out the overhead costs required to
undertake withholding and reporting among many employees.8 4
Today, the IRS utilizes sophisticated information-reporting
techniques to ferret out taxpayers that do not comply with the rules
regarding personal income tax on dividends and interest.8 5 By computer
matching third-party information reports and taxpayer returns, the IRS
can narrow the field of likely evaders.8 6 This method decreases the cost
of enforcement by: (1) reducing the number of audits necessary by
targeting audits at the class of taxpayers that are most likely to have
evaded, and (2) increasing the incentive to accurately report by
increasing the likelihood that a taxpayer that misstates their taxable
income will be caught.8 7
II. GLOBALIZATION'S EFFECT ON INCOME TAX ENFORCEMENT AND THE
VAT's APPEAL
Voluntary income tax compliance is positively correlated with
"visibility."88 When the taxpayer is entirely responsible for calculating
and paying her own taxes, such as those earning rents and royalties or
farm income, the compliance rate is just 46 percent.8 9 The compliance
rate jumps to over 90 percent when the income is subject to some form
of information reporting.90 The compliance rate increases further when
the income is subject to substantial information reporting, rising to over
95 percent.91 Expectedly, compliance reaches its peak of 99 percent
when the income is subject to substantial information reporting and
mergers and acquisitions that took place at "a remarkable, breakneck pace" and created
colossal organizations. Id.
84. See id. at 50.
85. See Joel Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion, 21 J. ECON.
PERSP. 25, 35 (2007) ("An extremely wide variety of transactions must be reported to the
IRS, including interest, dividends, real estate transactions, rents, sales of securities, and
wages. In 2002-2003 some 1.3 billion such reports were received (96 percent
electronically) and computer-matched with taxpayer records; the program entailed some
4.3 million taxpayer contacts and resulted in additional assessments amounting to almost
$5 billion.").
86. See id. at 35-38.
87. See id.
88. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, TAx GAP MAP FOR TAX YEAR 2001 (2007),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utltax-gap-update070212.pdf. "Visibility" refers
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withholding.92 Taxpayers who fall outside of the withholding and
reporting scheme, such as self-employed individuals, however, have
significantly lower compliance rates. 93
Steven Dean, a Professor of Tax Law and Policy at Brooklyn Law
School with expertise in the areas of tax havens and international
taxation,94 has summarized the problem that the IRS faces as follows:
The United States . . . has found itself facing a growing
disparity between the information it collects
domestically and the information it is able to acquire
from abroad. At the same time, globalization and
technological change have made the ability to acquire
useful extraterritorial tax information more important
than ever.95
The problem for tax administration is two-fold: (1) the global
economy creates incentives to engage in transactions abroad, whether
for legitimate business reasons or to take advantage of tax havens; and
(2) the IRS's information-gathering abilities are at their lowest ebb
outside of the United States.96
Without coordinated tax policies among governments, "the potential
mobility of economic activity makes it extremely difficult for
governments to exploit monopoly positions over much of their tax bases,
thereby greatly contributing to the distortions created in the course of
raising tax revenue." 97 That is, the global economy enables taxpayers to
go outside of their country of residence and seek out low-tax
jurisdictions (tax havens). 98
The United States tax system is unlike those of the majority of
industrialized countries. 99 Rather than relying on an income tax, over
130 countries have adopted "[tihe value-added tax ('VAT') [as] a
mainstay of [their] fiscal systems . . ., including every Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development ('OECD') country except the
United States."100 A VAT is a type of consumption tax that taxes the
92. See id.
93. Id.
94. Steven Dean, BROOKLYN LAW SCHOOL, https://www.brooklaw.edu/faculty/directory/
facultymemberfbiography.aspx?id=steven.dean Oast visited Nov. 13, 2012).
95. Dean, supra note 2, at 672.
96. See generally id.
97. Id. at 2-3.
98. See id.
99. See Itai Grinberg, Where Credit Is Due: Advantages of the Credit-Invoice Method for
A Partial Replacement Vat, 63 TAX L. REV. 309, 309 (2010).
100. Id. at 309.
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"value added" at each stage of production. In contrast, a retail sales tax,
a consumption tax commonly used at the state level in the United
States, taxes only the final sales price. Michael Graetz, Professor of Tax
Law at Columbia Law School, 10 1 argues that a VAT is easier to enforce
than a retail sales tax because VAT revenues can be "collected regularly
throughout the year from companies at all levels of production, rather
than just from retailers."10 2
Another distinct feature of the U.S. income tax is that "the United
States is the only economically developed country that taxes its citizens
abroad on their foreign income."10 3 The IRS is, generally, able to collect
from citizens employed by U.S. multinational corporations because
those corporations, like domestic corporations, report wage data to the
IRS.1°4 Enforcement becomes more difficult when the corporation is not
United States-based, however, because the corporation does not report
wage data to the IRS. 10 5 Without a third-party reporter, "[t]he IRS
might not even be aware of the overseas citizen's existence, and even if
the IRS is aware, it might have significant difficulty determining the
individual's income and tax liability."'10 6
Globalization has not forced the United States to change its
personal income tax policies because the United States has a large
economy and faces fewer international pressures than countries with
small open economies. 07 In small open economies, actors engage in
cross-border transactions with much greater frequency than actors in
larger, more closed economies. Due to their increased reliance on the
global economy, countries with small, open economies were the first to
change their tax policies to address the pressures of globalization. In
particular, this required adopting a consumption tax and lower income
tax in conformance with the rest of the international community in
order to avoid incentivizing the movement of transactions to tax-favored
jurisdictions.
101. Michael J. Graetz, COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL, http://www.law.columbia.edu/fac/
MichaelGraetz (last visited Nov. 14, 2012).
102. Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax
System, 112 Yale L.J. 261, 288 (2002).
103. Michael S. Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in A Global Economy, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443,
443 (2007).
104. Id. at 497.
105. Id.
106. Id. (footnote omitted).
107. See James R. Hines, Jr. & Lawrence H. Summers, How Globalization Affects Tax
Design 3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14664, 2009). "The relative
ease of international trade, capital movement and communication makes it possible for
production to locate in many places around the world and for tax burdens to be avoided
through international transactions." Id. at 2. An open economy is characterized by many
cross-border transactions.
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However, "[g]lobalization means that in some sense all countries are
becoming smaller," and large countries can expect to face the same
international pressures experienced by small countries and must
therefore change their tax systems in similar ways. 108 Thus far, the
United States has managed to maintain its reliance on income taxes due
to its large, and relatively closed, domestic economy. 0 9 But the rising
number of cross-border transactions is straining the efficacy of
third-party reporting.110 In the future, the United States is likely to
adopt tax policies that are more like those used by today's small, open
economies, like the VAT."'
In particular, globalization is undermining the government's ability
to rely on third-party reporting and withholding because taxpayers are
able to "hide their money in offshore tax havens."' 12 The loss in tax
revenues is substantial, amounting to approximately $50 billion a
year. 1 3 Globalization further burdens the IRS by increasing the cost of
enforcement," 4 because the IRS is unable to shift the cost of information
gathering onto third-parties. Instead, the IRS has pursued a costly
strategy of elaborate investigations and audits. In one famous case, the
IRS "used a private detective to 'entertain' a banker while the contents
of his briefcase were photographed to uncover the identities of tax
cheats."' 5 It is too expensive to discover and investigate all tax evaders
in this manner.
To ease its enforcement burden, the IRS has attempted to elicit
voluntary compliance from taxpayers directly through the Offshore
Voluntary Disclosure Program (OVDP). 116 OVDP targets "people hiding
offshore accounts" and encourages them to, according to IRS
Commissioner Doug Shulman, "come in and get right with [the IRS]
before [the IRS] find[s] you." 117 If a taxpayer discloses through OVDP,
he or she may face lower penalties than if they were caught by the
IRS.118 After processing 95 percent of disclosures, the IRS has collected
108. Id. at 3.
109. See id. at 13-14, 18-20.
110. Dean, supra note 2, at 672.
111. See Hines & Summers, supra note 107, at 18-20.
112. Steven A. Dean, Get the Havens to Help, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 11, 2006, at 1.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 1-2.
115. Id. at 1.
116. See IRS Offshore Programs Produce $4.4 Billion to Date for Nation's Taxpayers;
Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program Reopens, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-
Offshore-Programs-Produce-$4.4-Billion-To-Date-for-Nation%E2%80%99s-Taxpayers;-
Offshore-Voluntary-Disclosure-Program-Reopens (last updated Aug. 4, 2012).
117. Id.
118. Baker & Mckenzie Voluntary Disclosure Steering Committee, New 2011 Offshore
Voluntary Disclosure Initiative, 22 J. Int'l Tax. 20, 24-26 (2011) (explaining that under
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$3.4 billion from the 2009 program. 119 This amounts to 6.8 percent of
the estimated $50 billion kept in offshore tax havens each year. 120
Overall, the program's progress has been limited: "the really bad tax
cheats remain cheats and unless there is a 'stick' to bring these people
in, it is questionable how effective this program will be."'121
The IRS has also attempted to ease its administrative burden
through international information-exchange agreements. The United
States and other members of the OECD compiled a list of low- or no-tax
jurisdictions, "tax havens," and urged them to exchange information to
help OECD countries collect their unpaid income taxes.122 So far, "[t]he
governments of tax havens, by and large, have responded with empty
promises to cooperate."'123 Even if tax havens that have signed Tax
Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs), like "Antigua & Barbuda,
Aruba, the Bahamas, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands,
Guernsey, the Isle of Man, Jersey, and the Netherlands Antilles,"
complied with the agreements, the usefulness would be limited because
"many TIEAs narrowly define the circumstances in which an exchange
is required."' 24 For example, the Cayman Islands is only required to
provide the United States with information under the terms of the TIEA
"if the IRS has a 'valid reason' for suspecting a specific taxpayer of
criminal tax evasion.'1 25
To encourage information reporting, Professor Dean proposes
paying tax haven countries to report to the IRS.126 Specifically, Dean
suggests the tax-haven government could share "a fixed percentage of
any part of the lost $50 billion that tax havens help them to recover."'127
Attempting to create monetary incentives to disclose information about
income could cause the governments of tax-haven countries to hold out
and demand greater payment. It could even encourage other countries
to adjust their laws to transform their country into a tax haven that
OVDP, taxpayers owe penalties amounting to the lesser of "[e]ither an accuracy or
delinquency penalty .. . for all years . . . [and] information return and FBAR penalties,
[or] a penalty equal to 20% of the amount in foreign bank accounts or entities in the year
with the highest aggregate account or asset value").
119. IRS, supra note 116.
120. See Dean, supra note 112. Dean estimates that $50 billion in revenue is lost to
offshore tax havens each year. Id. $3.4 billion divided by $50 billion is 6.8%.
121. Baker & Mckenzie, supra note 118 at 27.
122. See Dean, supra note 112 at 1-2. "Most of the countries named (e.g., the Bahamas)
were no surprise, but other inclusions (war-torn Liberia) and omissions (OECD member
Switzerland) stood out." Id. at 2.
123. Id.
124. Kirsch, supra note 103, 500-01.
125. Id. at 501 n.254.
126. Dean, supra note 112 at 2.
127. Id.
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could share in the revenue.
Alternatively, the United States could follow the lead of countries
with small, open economies and adopt a consumption tax, like a VAT, 128
rather than relying almost exclusively on income taxes at the federal
level. In a global economy, consumption taxes are easier to administer
than income taxes because "expenditures have relatively clear
geographic associations, reducing the potential for international tax
avoidance and generally reducing the mobility of the tax base compared
to alternatives such as personal income taxes or source-based business
taxes including the corporate income tax."129
However, consumption taxes have met political resistance in the
United States because, in practice, they are "considerably less
progressive than income tax alternatives" and "movement away from
income taxation and in the direction of greater expenditure taxation is
typically associated with less equal after-tax distributions of income."130
Instituting an expenditure tax could have a particularly distortive effect
on income equality in the United States because income disparity
between the rich and the poor is so great today:
By just about any measure income has become
significantly less evenly distributed in the United States
over the past three decades. There is considerable
controversy over the extent to which changes to income
distribution in wealthy countries can be attributed to
the growth of international trade and investment,
though the evidence . . . strongly suggests that
globalization has contributed significantly to income
inequality.131
Acknowledging concerns about progressivity, Professor Graetz
proposed a combination of a VAT and an income tax in his article, 100
Million Unnecessary Returns: A Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax System. 132
A 10 to 15 percent VAT in combination with a 25 percent income tax on
incomes over $100,000 "would produce revenues roughly equivalent to
the current income tax."' 33 Importantly, the income tax would not apply
to incomes of $100,000 or less, and Graetz's "proposal, unlike the 'flat
tax' and 'fair tax' proposals, would not dramatically shift the tax burden
128. Hines & Summers, supra note 107 at 3.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 19.
131. Id. at 5.
132. Graetz, supra note 102 at 282-83.
133. Id. at 282 (footnote omitted).
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away from high-income families to middle- and lower-income
families."134 If progressivity is still a concern, the Congress could adjust
tax expenditures to increase programs that benefit the poor. For
example, policymakers could allocate more revenue for "education and
training programs[] that support income creation by less affluent
members of the population."'135 Moreover, incorporating a VAT into the
federal tax structure and "[r]educing income taxes [would] make the
U.S. tax system more favorable to investments by both U.S. residents
and foreigners. Our income tax would be lower than that of most other
nations, and our taxes on consumption would be comparable to those
imposed elsewhere.' 136
CONCLUSION
By WWII, third-party reporting and withholding emerged as
dominant enforcement strategies because they dramatically improved
compliance while shifting part of the administrative burden from the
IRS to independent entities, like employers and financial institutions.
Withholding transfers the decision of whether to comply with the
income tax from the taxpayer to a third party. The result is a highly
effective enforcement structure because the party with the incentive to
evade-the taxpayer-loses her ability to evade (assuming that the
withholding party has an incentive to comply with the law). Third-party
reporting has a similar effect, but to a somewhat lesser extent. An
individual whose income is subject to information reporting loses control
over the information that the government receives, but maintains
control over the actual payment of the tax. The result is that the
taxpayer can still choose not to pay her taxes, but she then faces a
heightened risk of detection because the government has a record of her
income and tax liability.
Between WWI and WWII, the BIR and the economy underwent
important structural changes that made withholding and information
reporting increasingly viable enforcement mechanisms. The BIR's
administrative capacity benefited from better-educated bureaucrats and
new accounting methods. At the same time, the development of large
corporations with division of ownership and streamlined accounting
processes that had incentives to abide by government regulations 137
134. Id. at 282-83.
135. Hines & Summers, supra note 107 at 19.
136. Graetz, supra note 102 at 286.
137. Third-party reporting and withholding are effective enforcement mechanisms when
the third-party has an incentive to transmit accurate information to the government, but
are ineffective when the third-party has an incentive to collude with the taxpayer. See
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 20:1
allowed the tax bureau to shift more and more of its administrative
costs to third parties.
Today, the economy is undergoing another substantial structural
change that is dramatically affecting income tax enforcement. Just as
the advent of corporations made the income tax viable through
structural enforcement mechanisms, globalization and the resulting
increased mobility of capital is depriving the IRS of third-party
information reporting and is making consumption taxes increasingly
viable. Consumption taxes are often associated with regressive taxation
and widening income inequality, but the United States has the capacity
to implement unique solutions to revive progressive taxation. Both
adopting a VAT to supplement the income tax and narrowing the
income tax base to only those earning high incomes could address the
administrative problems associated with third-party reporting abroad
without placing too great a burden on low- and middle-income
taxpayers.
Speed Bumps, supra note 11, at 712. When the third-party has an incentive to accurately
report the taxpayer's income, the government can "free ride" by relying on third-party
reporting or withholding for enforcement, rather than auditing the transaction. See id. Cf.
id. at 717 (explaining that the tax code gives preferential treatment to income that is
subject to third-party monitoring).
